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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
vVILLIAM J{. I-IO\'r ARD, RUTH N.
I-I OWARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD,
and SHIRI.JEY I_l. I-IO\'r"'\RD,
Plrtintiffs and Respondents,
-vs.~1ILDRED ~f. I-IO\VARD,
Defendant and Appellant,
l\fiLDRED l\1. HOWAR.D,
Defendant and Third Party
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.\\r ALICER BANI< & TRUST COl\1p ANY, as Administrator of the estate
of L. W. IIO\'r ARD, deceased, WILLIAM. l{. HOW_._L\RD, RUTH N. HOWARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD and
SHIRLEY L. HO\VARD,
Third Party Defendants,
and Respondents,

Case

No. 9552

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEl\1ENT OF THE CASE
This case is prosecuted to set aside a \V arranty Deed
given by the grantor during his lifetime to the grantee
in which deed the description was not a perfect one but
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which appellant contends was sufficient to convey the
property intended. Appellant prayed for judgment reforming the description to give effect to the deed.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COURT
The lower court adjudged the deed to be of no force
or effect and ruled that the property intended to be conveyed remained in the grantor, and denied the prayer of
appellant to have the deed reformed.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
That the deed be adjudged good and valid and that
title to the property therein described be decreed that of
the grantee, or if such judgment is not directed then that
the case be remanded to the lower court for trial.

STATEJIENT OF FACTS
Respondents herein are children of L. ''"'"· Howard,
who died intestate in Salt Lake ·County, t7tah, on Novmeber 30th, 1955, born of a deceased first ,vife of said
L. W. Howard. Appellant is the surviving \vido'v of said
L. W. Howard, the 1nother of t'vo children by L. W.
Howard. During hi~ lifetime, L. W. Howard held title
to a tract of land in Holladay, Salt Lake County, Utah
from which he and appellant herein conveyed three par-
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eels designated on map appended hereto, which parcels
are therein designated as Tracts "A", "B", and "C".

' T·

On ~lay 9th, 1945, I.J.
Howard drafted in his O\Vn
hand, a "'"arranty deed naming his wife, appellant herein,
as grantee~ \vhich deed describes the property as follows :
C~om

at ·a point :2.07 ch, ,V. & S. 52°30'E.5.24 ch
from Northeast cor. of Northwest l;i of sec 10
T 2 S R. 1 E S.L.B. & ~f and running thence N 56°
E 3.55 ch. thence S 39° E 6.15 ch thence· S 47° W
5.88 ch thence S 54°15'W 214.25 ft. thence N 46.0
25'W 404 ft more or less to a point which is South
55°30' W455 ft. thence S 46°25'E 154 ft. thence
S43°35'West 160 ft. more or less from beginning
Less roads
Less Temple & Woods
Less Theatre
Containing 2.75 acres more or less
The deed \Vas delivered to appellant with instructions to
place the same of record in the office of the Cotmty
Recorder of Salt Lake County, lJtah, upon the death of
L. W. Howard. Appellant did on December 1st, 1955,
record said deed in the office of the County Recorder and
the same was recorded in Book 1263, page 45 of the
county records (R. 43).
On l\Iay 13, 1947 the said L. W. Ho·w·ard made another deed naming his '\\rife, the appellant herein, as
grantee, describing a tract shown on the appended map
as Tract "D." This deed 'vas also delivered by said L. W.
Howard to appellant during the lifetime of L. W. Howard
and appellant recorded this deed in the office of the
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County Recorder of Salt Lake ·County, Utah, on December 1st, 1955. The description contained in this deed is
a good and sufficient description. (R. 4).
Appellant claims title to the properties covered by
each of said deeds by virtue of the grant therein eontabled. Respondents instituted these proceedings in the
lower court praying that the court decree that the deeds
from L. W. Howard to appellant are null and void and
of no effect and that the property described in each of
said deeds be decree that of L. W. Howard at the time
of his death (R. 1-8). Appellant answered the complaint of respondents and also filed her cross-complaint
as against Walker Bank & Trust Company as administrator of the estate of L. W. Howard, deceased, and
against respondents, praying that the deed bearing date
May 9th, 1945 be revised so as to express the true intent
and meaning of L. W. Howard, and that appellant be
adjudged and decree the owner in fee simple of the land
described by said deeds. (R. 16-20)
The case was called for pre-trial at which the lower
court held the deed bearing date !fay 9th, 1945 defective
and that it conveyed no property, and entered its judgment fron1 'vhich this appeal is taken. (R. 45)
Appellant filed timely objections to the judgn1ent, also a
motion to assign the case for trial, a motion to amend her
cross-complaint, and a motion for New Trial, all of which
were denied by the lower court. (R. 44) (R. 48)
The single question is whether that deed, dated ~fay
9th, 1945, 'vhich the trial eourt held to be defective, con-
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tained such description that the land might be identified
which 'vas intended to be conveyed and therefore did
convey the property. And 'vhether the trial court errored
in denying appellant's motion to assign the case for trial
and to per1nit appellant to amend her cross-complaint.

STATEl\fENT OF POINTS RELIED (TPON
1.
THE DEED BEARING DATE MAY 9th, 1945 CONTAINS
SUCH DESCRIPTION THAT THE INTENT OF THE GRANTOR IS CLEARLY EXPRESSED.

2.
THE FALSE STATEMENT IN THE DESCRIPTION
WILL NOT DEFEAT THE GRANT.

3.
THE DEED CONTAINS A DESCRIPTION WHICH A
SURVEYOR COULD USE TO LOCATE THE PARCEL INTENDED TO BE CONVEYED, ON THE GROUND.

4.
AN OMISSION OF PART OF A BOUNDARY OR CALL
IS NOT FATAL TO THE VALIDITY OF A DEED WHERE
SUCH BOUNDARIES OR CALLS CAN BE SUPPLIED OR
THE DESCRIPTION RENDERED CERTAIN.

5.
IF THE DESCRIPTION MAY BE HELPED BY EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE, THEN APPELLANT IS ENTITLED
TO A TRIAL AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRODUCE EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE.
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ARGU!IENT
POINT I.
THE DEED BEARING DATE l\1AY 9th, 1945 CONTAINS
SUCH DESCRIPTION THAT THE INTENT OF THE GRANTOR IS CLEARLY EXPRESSED.

·By the description as contained in the deed, the
grantor definitely established the point of beginning by
tying to "the Northeast corner of Northwest 74 of sec.
10 T 28 r. 1 E S.L.B.&~1"; he then describes the next
four courses exactly as are described in the deed by which
he received title, then it is clearly sho·wn that he intended
to cut off the west jog and to follow a line on a course
N.46°25'W being the same course as described in the deed
by which grantor took title after going around the piece
protruding on the west. Grantor describes this west line
with particularity a distance of 404 feet more or less and
it is shown by a portion of that which then follows that
the grantor was intending to arrive at the Northeast
corne·r of his property; true he does go off on another angle but the distance he refers to is ±55 feet
which is the distance from grantor's northeast corner as
given in the deed by '"'hich he took title and the place
of beginning, then grantor goes southeasterly using the
same variation as his northwest line of 46°25'West the
same distance of 154 feet, then he follo,vs approximately
the north line of the tract 'Yhich it is evident he intended
to omit, the san1e distance 'Yhich that north line carries.
It is further evident that "rhen the grantor inserted the
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words "beginning'' he thought he had described to the
place of beginning.
POINT II.
THE FALSE STATEMENT IN THE DESCRIPTION
WILL NOT DEFEAT THE GRANT.

The last calls locate nothing nor do they change the
westerly line 'vhich the grantor specifically defined and
which line did follow the true course. Those calls are
surplusage and may be disregarded.
In 2 Devlin on Deeds, Third Ed. Vol. 2, at section
1013a we find the law stated as follows:
"If the land conveyed can be identified by the
other calls of the description an impossible or
senseless course will not be considered," citing
Brose v. Boise City, R.R. 5 Idaho 695.
and at section 1035 we find the follo,ving:
"If a description is otherwise complete and
accurate, a false statement in it will not defeat
the grant."
In Thompson on Real Property, Perm. Ed. Vol. 6,
Formal Parts of Deeds at Section 327 4, page 445 we
find the following:
"Rejection of false or erroneous description.
After an accurate description, an inaccurate description follo"ring which is Inerely cumulative will
be rejected. Thus, 'vhere the deed contains two
descriptions, one of which describes the land "\vith
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reasonable certainty, and the other is incorrect
in some particulars, the incorrect particular will
be rejected as surplusage. "\Vhere the land is sufficiently described for the purpose of identification after eliminating an incorrect part of the description, the deed is read as if such description
were eliminated and effect is given to the remaining part of the description."
Citing Vaughn v. Continental Royalty Co., 116
Fed. (2d) 72;
Hanlon v. Western Loan, ±6 Cal. App. (2d) 580,
116 P. (2d) 465;
Mizell v. Osmon, 324 Mo. 321, 189 SW 2d 306;
State v. Franco-American Soc. (Tex.) 172 SW 2d
731;
Copeland v. Carpenter, 206 Ga. 822, 59 SE 2d 245;
DeLong v. Starkey, 120 Ind. App. 288, 92 NE 2d
228.
In 2 Devlin on Deeds, Third Ed., \: ol. 2, at section
1012, p. 1916 it is said:
'~What

is a sufficient description. A deed is
not void for uncertainty because there 1nay be
errors or an inconsistency in some of the particulars. If a surveyor, by applying the rules of surveying can locate the land, the description is
sufficient and the deed 'vill be sustained. And
generally, the rule may be stated to be that the
deed will be sustained if it is possible from the
whole description to ascertain and identify the
land intended to be eonveyed."
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"As that is certain \\"hich can be made certain,
the description if it \vill enable a person of ordinary prudence acting in good faith and making
inquiries \Yhich the description \vould suggest
to him, to identify the land is sufficient."
Citing Ford, S.D. 124 NW 1108.
I-Iayes v. ~fartin, 144 Ala. 532, 40 So. 204.
In Tho1npson on Real Property above cited, Section
3271 Pocket Supp. at page 60 it is said:
.. When the description in a deed is erroneous,
that which is intended to be conveyed, rather than
that which is descr.ibed, is conveyed. A subsequent
erroneous addition will not be permitted to limit
or impair what has been definitely described in
the deed." (Italics added.)

Citing U.S. v. Big Bend Transit, 42 Fed. Supp.
459;
Bruni v. Viduarri, 140 Tex. 138, 166 SW 2d 81.
POINT III.
THE DEED CONTAINS A DESCRIPTION WHICH A
SURVEYOR COULD USE TO LOCATE THE PARCEL INTENDED TO BE CONVEYED, ON THE GROUND.

By the affidavit attached to appellant's 1notion for
New Trial it is stated that appellant was prepared to
offer the testimony of ·C.C. Bush of the engineering firm
of Bush & Gudgell to the effect that he could locate the
land on the ground from the description contained in the
deed. By the court's granting judgment on the pleadings
the appellant was not afforded the opportunity to introduce such evidence.
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The granting of judgment on the pleadings without a
trial of this case is, we contend, no more favored by our
courts than are Summary Judgments, this because litigants are prevented from fully presenting their case to
the court. Such 'vas the holding in Brandt v. Springville
Bank, lOU 2d 350, 353 P2d 460 in which the court said :
"For the reason that a summary judgment
prevents litigants from fully presenting their
case to the court, courts are, and should be, reluctant to invoke this remedy."
And in Morris v. Farnsworth j\:Iotel, 123 U. 289, 259
P2d 297 our court said:
"The party against whom the summary judgment is granted is entitled to the benefit of having
the court consider all of the facts presented."
That statement of law followed the ruling of our
court in R. J. Dawn Const. Co., v. Child, 122 U. 194, 247
P2d 817.
The same rule of law applies in this case where judgment has been granted on pleadings. Applicant has n
defense to the action and she pleaded it.
The rule if a surveyor, by applying the rules of surveying can locate the land, the description is sufficient
and the deed will be sustained is announced in 2 Devlin
on Deeds, Third Ed., Vol. 2, Section 1012 at page 1916,
which rule is also followed in Blume v. l\IacGregor,
(Cal.) 148 P2d at 661, Best v. Wohlford, 144 Cal. 733, 78
Pac. 293; Thou1pson v. 1\fcl{enna, 22 Cal. App. 129, 132,
133 P. 512, and 16 A1n. J ur. Deeds, Sec. 263, p. 586.
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In the Blu1ne v. l\facGregor case '"e find the following statement at page 661.
In general if a competent surveyor can take
the deed and locate the land on the ground from
the description contained therein, 'vith or without
the aid of extrinsic evidence, the description will
be held to be sufficient."
H

In Harrison v. Everett, 308 P2d 216, citing Wheeler
Perry ·Co. v. Mortgage Bond Co. (Ariz.) 17 P2d 331 involving question of priority of lien of mortgag~ as
against judgment where debtors had filed Homestead
Declaration describing therein Lots 13 and 14, Mount
Pleasant tract and omitting the Block No. 4 from the
description, as a result the judgment creditor c-ontended
that because of the erroneous description the declaration
was ineffectual, the court said:
"A description of the property is essential
to a valid declaration of homestead but the description need not be more particular than is required in the case of a deed." Then follows citation of many of the authorities heretofore referred
to. The court going on further said: "It will be
seen from the foregoing that the description of the
land as embodied in the declaration "\Vas sufficient
to afford a means of identification and therefore
fulfills the requirements of a particular description."
POINT IV.
AN OMISSION OF PART OF A BOUNDARY OR CALL
IS NOT FATAL TO THE VALIDITY OF A DEED WHERE
SUCH BOUNDARIES OR CALLS CAN BE SUPPLIED OR
THE DESCRIPTION RENDERED CERTAIN.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12

The intention of the parties is to be ascertained
by considering all the provisions of the deed, as well as
the situation of the parties, and then to give effect to
such intention if practical, when not contrary to law.
2 Devlin on Deeds, Third Ed. Vol. 2, section 836, p. 1508.

' r·

In Holleys Ext. v. Curry, 58
\T a. 70, 51 SE 135,
112 Am. St. Rep. 944, and in 18 CJ 180, 181, 26 CJS
Deeds, Sec. 30 and 100, pp 210 and 357, and in Sanders v.
Baker, 231 SW 2d 106 (Ark.) it is said that the office
of a description in a deed is not to identify the land but
to furnish means of identification.
This rule is also announced in Thompson on Real
Property (Perm. Ed.) \rol. 6, Pocket Supp. Sec. 3268.
Section 1013d, 2 Devlin further says :
"The principal purpose of the construction is
to ascertain the true intent of the language and
when that intent has been ascertained, it should
be allowed to have paramount force and great
liberality is always exercised in constructing that
part of the deed in which the property conveyed
is described and the description will be sufficient
if it supplies the means for identifying the land
to be conveyed."
And in 26 ·CJ·s, Sees. 30 and 100, pp· 210 and 357 the
law is stated as follo\YS :
~'A

deed 'viii not be held void for uncertainty
of description if hy any reasonable construction it
can be n1ade available."
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In Devlin at section 1013 it is further said:
··'\There the description is uncertain, reference may be 1nade to prior deeds conveying the
same land."
The deed by which L. \V. 1-Io,vard took title may be
referred to.
POINT V.
IF THE DESCRIPTION MAY BE HELPED BY EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE, THEN APPELLANT IS ENTITLED
TO A TRIAL AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRODUCE EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE.

We find Tiffany on Real Property, Third Ed., section 997 reads as follows:
""\Vith the exception of the broad principals
that a conveyance will not be declared void for
insufficiency in its description of the property
which it purports to convey if it is possible by any
reasonable rule of construction, aided by extrinsic
ev.idence, to identify the property intended, it is
impossible to give any general rules by which to
detennine whether in the case of any particular
conveyance the description is sufficiently operative. The court will, if possible, with the aid of
evidence introduced for the purpose, find a particular piece of land 'vhich the description serves
to differentiate from other land." (Italics added.)
In Devlin it is said that the fourth side of a rectangle
may be supplied 'vhere the intent of the parties is clear,
and the grantee has entered into possession. Respondents
will probably contend that our description is not that of
a rectangle, this 've concede but our description is more
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than a rectangle and all the more shows the intent of
the grantor, he having specifically followed the variances
and distances to the closing line.
Devlin also states at section 1013b:
"A description is sufficient where there is
but one line to find to locate the land as the land
conveyed may be identified by extrinsic evidence."
In the instant case there is but one line to find 1 that
is the closing line.
And at Section 103la Devlin states:
"If a deed omits one of .the calls in the field
notes, yet if, by the description ·given and reversing the calls in the field notes, .the missing call
can be supplied, and the land to be conveyed ascertained, the deed is not· V-oid for uncertainty."
Citing 1\{ontgomery. v. Carlton,~ 56 Tex. 431.
In Deal v. Cooper, 94 .~fo. 62, 6 S\V .707 the court
held that if it ap-pears there is an·_9bvious ·omission in the
description but the deed affords sufficient data to supply
the omission, the def~ct "\Yill be cured by construction.
And this Court in Losee v.
Jones, 120
U. 385, 235
.
P2d 132 at page 137 in speaking of- an omission said:
"Appellants riext iaise the contention that
the deed from the In other_ to Elenora Jones Bingluun is void by reason of an erroneous description
whereby the calls fail to close.· In their brief they
quote from Patton on Titles, Sec. 74, p. 265, as
follows:
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HEither as actually described or construed,
the lines the1nselves must be continuous, one comtnencing \Vhere the other leaves off, and the final
line returning to the point of beginning. Otherwise, they do not inclose, and therefore do not
describe any tract of land."
"This may be due to omission of one of the
lines from the description or to a mis-description
of one of the lines. To a certain extent, however,
this situation has been overcome by the fact that
the courts will supply the line by intend1nent when
by so doing the boundaries \\rill be complete and
will close approximately the acreage called for in
the description. Also, a 1nanifest error in the
calls may be corrected even to the extent of reversing the direction of a line. Even when the lines are
continuous, they may fail to enclose any tract of
land owing to failure of the final line to return to
the starting point. Unless the description as
stated, or as it may be allowably construed, can
be made to close, the grant must fail."
"In the construction of boundaries, we
again find that the intention of the parties is the
controlling consideration. ~Iachado v. Title, Guaranty & Trust Co., 15 Cal. 2d 180, 99 P. 2d 245;
Park v. Wilkinson, 21 Utah 279, 60 P. 945. In
the present case, we believe the Elenora Jones
Bingham deed capable of such construction as to
form an enclosure in accordance with the intent
expressed therein. The deed fixes a definite and
clear point of beginning, continues by courses
and distances to the last corner, and then concludes : '~ * * * thence east 2.5 chains more or less
to the place of beginning."
"~.\.s stated by this court in the case of Park v.
''rilkinson, 21 Utah 279, 60 P. 945, 946: "The
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words used in the deed should be construed so as
to ascertain the intention of the parties making
it, and when the intention of the parties can be
ascertained therefrom, nothing re1nains to effectuate that intention.'
"But when there are no natural monuments
or lines called for by \\rhich the closing line is to
be fixed or ascertained, and no line on the ground,
it follows, of necessity, that the survey is to be
closed by a direct line between the termini of the
lines on the ground, or as fixed by the courses and
distances returned to ascertain those termini."
It is conceded that in the Losee case "rhile the description as given did not close it recited ''to the place
of beginning.'' However 've contend the principal of law
as laid down by said case is applicable inasmuch as the
court in the Losee case refers to Ransberry v. Broadhead, a Pennsylvania case, 174 Atl. 97 'vhich 'vas a case
to test title to part of a stream and land adjoining, the
description of the property did not close and one of the
defenses set up was defective description in that it failed
to close. In quoting fron1 the ease "'"e find the following:
"Appellant urges that the description in the
Stites' deed will not close. The court said the
course, the metes and bounds must be considered,
they should be follovved and, if possible, made
to close, but as indicated in Wharton v. Carvin,
34 Pa. 340, 342, 'vhere there are no natural or artificial n1onuments by "'"hich to close the line, it
follows of neeessity that the suryey should be
closed by di rPct line between the termini of the
line established on the ground. That is 'vhat 'vas
done in the ease and "~e see no error in it."
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Frorn vVharton v. Garvin, 34 Pa. 340, cited in above
case we quote the following:
"Generally a survey is to be carried to its
calls, unless there are actual lines on the ground
excluding them. In that case the lines on the
ground will control the calls, for they constitute
the survey. But UJhen there are no natural monuments or lines called for, by which the clo,s~ng line
is to be fixed and ~ascerta:ined, and no line on the
ground, it follottvs of necessity, that the survey
is to be closed by a direct l~ne between the termini of the lines on the ground, or as fixed by the
courses and distances returned, to ascertain these
termini. It was ascertained in this case, that the
north and south boundaries, by their courses and
distances, did not reach the river by the number
of rods already stated. And if we are· to discard
the river as a call, then the west boundary must
necessarily be closed by a straigwht line from point
to point of the side lines. There is no other process by which it may be done." (Italics added.)
The above wording is adopted by the Utah court in
Park v. Wilkinson, supra.
An interesting case in point where there is neither
call for the last course or the words, "to beginning," is
that of Blume v. ~facGregor, (Cal.) 148 P2d 656 in which
we find the court stating at page 660 :
"The true issue as to the ten foot strip as developed at the trial arose from the fact that the
description of the land conveyed in 1884 by Pacific
Improvement Co. to California and Nevada Railroad Company omitted certain courses and distances and if follo,ved literally described an irSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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regular parcel varying in width from approximately 14 feet at its narrowest, to over 80 feet
at its widest, and would only close by drawing an
arbitrary line from the end of the last course given
to the point of beginning. In view of the fact
that this 1884 conveyance was expressed to be a
strip of land for the right of way of its railroad,
the missing courses and distances fairly suggest
themselves on the face of the deed, bearing in
mind the well-known fact that railroad rights of
way are commonly strips of land of uniform
width."
'The court there further said :
''Such interpretation must be given to a deed
as to make it effective rather· than to defeat it."
Hall v. Bartless, 158 Cal. 638, 642, 112 P. 176; 9
Cal. Jur. 258-9.
''An omission of part of the boundaries or
calls is not fatal to the validity of a deed, where
such boundaries or calls can be supplied or the
description rendered certain."
26 CJS Deeds, Sec. 30, p. 220; 18 C.J. 185, and
numerous cases there cited.
''If the description is indefinite, as by the
omission of a line, then a statement of the quantity
may help to locate the boundaries. 4 Cal. Jur.
404; 9 Cal. Jur. 314-5."
The grantor conveyed to defendant 2.75 acres more
or less. In order to convey this acreage it is necessary
to surround a tract of land. By supplying the last call,
grantor would have conveyed approxiinately the acreage
called for by the deed. Then too, grantor expressly conveyed a tract out of which he had previously conveyed
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the Temple and Woods and theatre tracts. ~.,rom a reading of authorities on Deeds and conveyancing it is clearly evident that had the grantor, L. W. Howard simply
described 2.75 acres, 1nore or less the starting point commencing at a point 2.07 ch. W. and 8.52°30' E.5.24 ch
from Northeast cor. of Northwest :1;4 of sec. 10, T2 SR.l
E.S.L.B.&M. out of a tract from which the Temple &
Woods and the theatre tracts had been conveyed, it would
have been sufficient. This is the only tract owned by L.
W. Howard in this particular area. It is to be noted too
that the abstractors in the County Recorder's Office were
able to detennine that property intended to be conveyed,
having indexed the property in NWl)tNE14 & NEVi
NWlfi Sec. 10-2S-1E. (See notation on left side of deed
(R. 43).
In 16 Am. Jur. Deeds, Sec. 265 at page 587 we find
the following statement of law:
"It may be laid down as a general rule that
a deed conveying a part of a tract of land or a
given number of acres out of a tract is not void
for uncertainty although it does not attempt to
locate the part of the tract conveyed. In a few
cases, however, conveyances have been held to be
ineffectual and void for uncertainty where the
land is described merely as a fractional part of
a designated tract or where in addition to giving
the acreage the deed ineffectually atte1npts to
locate specifically the land conveyed. Even under
this view, a conveyance of a specified number of
acres designated as being located at a given corner
of a designated lot or tract is sufficient to sustain
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the deed which will be construed as conveying
· a tract containing the designated number of acres
in a square form."
In Jones v. lV[abrey, 225 SW2d 561 ('Tenn.) it "\Vas
held that a deed purporting to convey a stated number of
unlocated acres, bounded by general specifications, out
of a larger tract of land pres1L111ably owned by the grantor
is not void.
We find an interesting case in which the last call
of the description of a proposed . new ordinance was
omitted and no reference contained carrying the description to the place of beginning, in that of Central Mission
Oil & City of St. James, 111 SW2d 215, 232 Mo. App. 142.
"An action was brought to test the validity of
the ordinance extending the limits of the city of
St. James. Plaintiffs objecting to the ordinance
claimed that it was invalid because the call on the
east line was omitted. The court said that although there is a manifest omission in the description of the new line as it passes around the ball
park, yet there is sufficient data from which the
omission can be easily supplied and the description hereby rendered certain. The description
shows clearly the omission of the line running
from the eastern terminus of the line on the north
side of the ball park to the beginning of the line
running 'vest on the south side of the ball park~
the call omitted being 'thence south 551 feet along
the east side of ball park to pin.' 'Ve think it is
obvious that it was the intention to surround the
ball park. Three sides are accurately described,
all the corners defined and located, and it seems
to us that a person of common understanding can
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readily sup ply the omitted li,nc. The ~arne rule
applies to descriptions in extension proceedings
as applies to descriptions in deeds. The court
there further says: 'Our Supreme Court in Deal
v. Cooper, 94 NW 62, said, "\\Then the deed applied
to the subject matter shows a manifest omission
in the description and there is sufficient data furnished by the deed to supply the omission, the
omission will be supplied by construction." N umerous other cases supporting this rule of law
are therein cited. (Italics added.)

The question might arise whether the law and cases
herein contained apply to a deed of gift, one without consideration. On this point we cite IIazelett v. Bryan, 192
Tenn. 251, 241 SW2d 121 \vhich held that equity will
reform a description in favor of a donee in a deed of gift.
See also 69 ALR, p. 416. Thompson on Real Property
(Perm. Ed.) Vol. 6 Pocket Supp. Deeds. Sec. 3275.
It appears that the legislature of the State of Utah
has not enacted laws 'vhich might act as a guide on this
point, as have some of the states. We do find however,
in the footnotes to Section 57-1-12, UCA 1953 on the form
of Warranty Deed, a reference to 69 ALR 423 on reformation of conveyance, right to as depending upon consideration. This annotation is found following the case of
Launderville v. l\Ietro, Montana, 281 Pac. 749, which is in
point and in which case the plaintiff brought action to
reform a deed which had been given to her without consideration passing as against another heir of the deceased
grantor. The question 'vas raised in the defense to the
action as to the right to have the deed reformed as it 'vas
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but a voluntary deed and the mistake. was not a mutual
mistake as the grantee had no knowledge of the deed
having been executed. The court held that the reason
for the rule that equity will not reform a·voluntary deed
as against the donor does n<?t exist ~n. favor of his heirs,
and that a court of equity has inherent power in a proper
case to reform a voluntary ·conveyance so as to have the
deed express the intention.·-of the grantor, even though,
strictly speaking, the mistake is- not. mutua~. T~e above
case is an old case and appears to have been followed
repeatedly to the p-resent day.
..

In Harth v. Roper, 88 SE 2d 142, 242 N.C. 489 the
court said the fact that there were five calls in the .deed
and that if the calls were surveyed _as called· for in the
deed, lines would not close, did not render the. description
incomplete.
And in White v. Spahr, 59 SE2d 916, 207 _Ga. 10 it
is said:
"'The description of land contained in a deed
is not void for uncertainty if it furnishes a key
to identify the land." See also Lev.ris v. Bowen,
75 SE 2d 422.
In Blue Ridge v. Telfair, 54 SE 2d 608, 205 ·Ga. 808
the court said :
"v\There it can be gathered from v.rords employed in a deed that intention of grantor was to
convey the whole of a tract of land owned by him,
even a vague .description of the tract 'lcill suffice
~~ by aid of competent parol evidence its precise
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locat_ion is capable of ascertainment and its -identity can be established." (Italics added.)

And in Brown v. Hurley, 90 SE 2d 324, 243 N.C. 138
the Court held that even if a boundaries description .does
not go entirely around the land it does not invalidate the
description.
It is stated in 16 Am. J ur. Deeds page 585 that the
courts are extremely liJberal in construing descriptions
of premises conveyed with the view of determining
whether these descriptions are suff.iciently definite and
certain to ident~fy land and ·make the instrument operative .as a conveyance. (Italics added.) Following this
rule of la'v we find in Nolen v. Henry, 190 Ala. 540, which,
while an old case appears to be one repeatedly followed
by courts of other jurisdictions, the court said :
"It is of course, well settled that the law leans
against the destruction of a deed for uncertainty
of description, but will construe the deed, where
it can be done consistently with legal rules, so as
to give effect to the intention of the parties, and
not to defeat it. Every .deed o1tght to be so construed, if it can, that the intent of the parties may
prevail and not be defeate:d." (Italics added.)
In closing we cite 16 Am. Jur. Deeds, Sec. 263, p.
586 as follows :
''The fact that parts of the description given
of the property are incorrect or incomprehensible
will not destroy the operative effect of a conveyance, if a sufficient part of the description remains
for purposes of identification."
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and Sec. 288. "An uncertain general description will also
be controlled by a more specific and certain description."
CONCLUSION
That description contained in the deed placing the
northwest corner of the property clearly out of the course
followed by the definite north south line on the west is
surplusage and is not to be considered. The last course
carrying the description to the place of beginning 'vhich
must be supplied to enclose the property, defendant is
entitled to have supplied under her reformation action
in order to carry out the intent of the grantor. Tllis may
be done by the court as pointed out by our O"\vn Supreme
Court in Park v. Wilkinson, 21 Utah, at page 284 heretofore referred to wherein the court quoted from one of
the accepted rules of law as follows:
"But 'Yhen there are no natural monuments
or lines called for by which the closing line is to be
fixed or ascertained, and no line on the ground, it
follows of necessity that the survey is to be closed
by a direct line between the termini of the lines
on the ground, or as fixed by the courses and distances returned to ascertain those termini."
While it appears the distance of the 'vest line as
given in the deed of 404 feet did not quite reach the
Northwest corner of the land as described in the deed by
which L. W. Howard received title, it is clearly apparent
that Mr. Howard intended to go to that corner as he
gave this call as 404 feet more or less. Following the
rule of law above stated and the northwest corner being
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established by the deed by which L. W. Howard took title
the line should continue to that corner then the last call
or closing call should extend from the termini of that corner to the place of beginning.
Respectfully submitted,
M. V. BACKMAN of
Backman, Backman & Clark
Attorneys for .Appellant
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